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L Facts
During the evening of February 7, 1993, the defendant, Lance Antonio
Chandler, Jr. ("Chandler"), Geraldine Fernandez ("Fernandez"), Dwight Wyatt
('Wyatt"), and George Boyd ("Boyd' discussed robbing Mother Hubbard's, a
local convenience store.' After suggesting to the others that the clerk at Mother
Hubbard's was 'a little bit slow' and would not give them any trouble," Chandler
revealed that he knew they could secure a gun from his half-brother, Henry
Chappell ("Chappell"), who was hiding a fully-loaded revolver for Chandler.2
The group of four, together with Bernice Murphy, Chandler's girlfriend, went to
Chappell's house in South Boston, Virginia, and retrieved the gun.3 On the way
to Mother Hubbard's, Wyatt inspected the gun, confirmed that it was loaded, and
handed it to Chandler.4 Chandler, Wyatt and Boyd went into the convenience
store, at which point Boyd and Wyatt headed to the rear of the store to steal beer
while Chandler approached the clerk, William Howard Dix ("Dix").' Chandler
then demanded money and, when Dix did not respond, he pointed the gun at
Dix, pulled the trigger, and said, "boom."6 The gun failed to fire and Chandler
pulled the trigger a second time, shooting Dix in the face.' Chandler, Wyatt and
Boyd fled the scene, carrying a case of beer.'
Chandler was found guilty of capital murder during the commission of
robbery.9 At Chandler's request, defense counsel neither presented evidence nor
made a closing argument during the penalty phase.'" The jury recommended a
sentence of death based on the finding that Chandler constituted a continuing
threat to society." At the final sentencing hearing, held pursuant to section 19.2-
264.5 of the Virginia Code, Chandler decided to present some mitigating evi-
dence. 12 The trial court confirmed the death sentence and the Supreme Court of




5. Chandler, 1998 WL 279344, at *1.
6. Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
7. Id Dix did not die instantly; the bullet passed through his mouth into his neck, bruising
his spinal cord and paralyzing the muscles that controlled his breathing. Id
8. Chandler, 1998 WL 279344, at *1.
9. Id at *2.
10. Id at *3.
11. Id, at *4.
12. Chandler, 1998 WL 279344, at *4.
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Virginia upheld the conviction and sentence on appeal.13
After unsuccessfully pursuing state habeas relief, Chandler filed his federal
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia on February 10, 1997.14 This appeal followed that
court's denial of relief.
On appeal Chandler alleged that (1) the district court erred in denying his
claim that his Equal Protection rights were violated when the Commonwealth
used three out of five peremptory challenges to remove three black jurors from
the jury;"s and (2) under the doctrine of Strickland v. Washington,"6 the district
court erred in denying his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 7
II. Holding
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, held (1) Chan-
dler failed to offer evidence that would support a finding that the Common-
wealth's exercise of three of its peremptory challenges to remove three black
potential jurors was racially motivated;18 and (2) under the circumstances, assis-
tance of counsel was not constitutionally ineffective.19
III. Application/Anaysis in Virginia
A. Batson Claim
Chandler contended that his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment were violated when the Commonwealth used three out
of five peremptory challenges to remove three black potential jurors from the
jury."° Chandler argued that the race-neutral explanations offered by the prosecu-
tion for the striking of these jurors were pretexts for unlawful discrimination.21
The court found no violation of Batson v. Kentuckf a because Chandler failed to
prove that the trial court's determination that the Commonwealth struck the
potential jurors for "race neutral" reasons was erroneous.' That one of the race-
13. Id at *4-5.
14. Id at *5.
15. Id
16. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
17. Cbandler, 1998 WL 279344, at *7.
18. Id
19. Id at *8-*10.
20. Id at *5.
21. Cbandr, 1998 WL 279344, at *6. The state prosecutor justified the striking two of the
three potential jurors because of their opposition to the death penalty. The record indicated that
the third juror was struck because of his "remarkably non-communicative" attitude duringvoirdire.
Id at *6-7.
22. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
23. Chandler, 1998 WL 279344, at *6-7. See aso Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)
(holding that the use of peremptory strikes may not be based on race). Note that even though
potential jurors with reservations about the death penalty may not be systematicaly excluded, it is
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neutral explanations offered was that the potential juror was "remarkably non-
communicative" during voir dire serves to illustrate how simple it is for a prose-
cutor to manufacture a "race neutral" explanation for the use of a peremptory
strike. Defense counsel must make every effort to do more than question the
content of the explanations proffered by the Commonwealth. Counsel for
Chandler went beyond questioning the basis of the strikes by making a successful
showing that there were white potential jurors who were equally non-communi-
cative. This approach is to be commended and encouraged.24
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Chandler's principal claim dealt with the failure of his attorney to conduct
an investigation of mitigating evidence for the sentencing phase of the trial.2" He
claimed that this affected his decision to forgo a defense at trial such that it was
not a "knowing waiver."'
The Fourth Circuit excused this failure to investigate, noting that the duty
to make reasonable investigation found in Stricklandv. Washington7 can be limited
by the actions of the client.' The court of appeals discovered no evidence of
mental defect in the record, concluded that the trial judge had engaged in
"careful, lengthy questioning" of Chandler, and, accordingly, rejected this ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claim.'
The second prong of Chandler's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was
that, after he changed his mind, defense counsel failed to present mitigating
evidence that was reasonably available to the court at the final sentencing
hearing.3" The court of appeals' rejection of this claim was not responsive. The
Fourth Circuit simply determined that the evidence presented at the final sen-
tencing hearing was sufficient, in that it constituted an "accurate representation"
permissible to exercise peremptory strikes to remove them. Batson is grounded only in the Four-
teenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, not the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.
Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474,486-87 (1990).
24. See Marcus E. Garcia & James W. Miller,Jr., Opposing Peremptory Challenges Under Batson,
CAP. DEF. DIG., vol. 4, no. 2, p.2 3 (1992).
25. Chandler also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for trial counsel's failure to request
an instruction explaining the concept of mitigating evidence to the jury and for trial counsel's failure
to object to the trial court's refusal to inform the jury that, if given a life sentence, Chandler would
not be eligible for parole for twenty-five years. These claims were rejected under concepts of well-
settled law and will not be discussed in this summary.
26. Chandler, 1998 WL 279344, at *8.
27. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
28. The court cited Strickland "[tihe reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined
or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions." Chandler, 1998 WL
279344, at *8 (citation omitted).
29. Id During extensive questioning by the court, "Chandler acknowledged that he under-
stood that he had the right to present evidence and argument to the sentencing jury, that he had
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of Chandler's life story."' This analysis failed to address the pivotal question;
namely, whether there was reasonably available mitigation evidence that was not
presented by .counsel.
Defense counsel can best avoid this situation by electing to investigate,
prepare, and present mitigating evidence, regardless of the defendant's original
insistence on not presenting any such evidence. For many, if not all, clients
facing possible death sentences who object, there is ample authority for counsel
to override their wishes and pursue independent investigation.32
Alix Marie Karl
31. Chander, 1998 WL 279344, at *8. The court reasoned that the presentation of evidence
was "not ineffective" because "[t~he most salient facts concerning Chandler's background, the
circumstances of the murder, and Chandler's state of mind were fully presented to the court." Id,
at *9.
32. See Susan F. Henderson, Presenting Mitiation Against the Client's Wishes: A Moral or
ProfessionalImperative?, CAP. DEF. DIG., vol. 6, no. 1, p. 32 (1993). See aLro Penny J. White, When the
Client Wants to Die -- Ethical Obligations of Counsel, Continuing Legal Education Seminar, Virginia
Capital Case Clearinghouse Materials (4/3/98). The language of the Virginia Code of Professional
Responsibility also provides some guidance in this area. See Ethical Considerations 7-7 and 7-11
as well as Disciplinary Rule 7-101 (granting attorneys some leeway in using their professional
judgment to make decisions regarding case strategy). In addition, the American Bar Association
Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 4-4.1 (a), reads in relevant part:
Defense counsel should conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the
case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case and the
penalty in the event of conviction. The investigation should include efforts to secure
information in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities. The
duty to investigate exists regardless of the accused's admissions or statements to defense counsel of
facts constituting guilt or the accused's stated desire to plead guilv.
Id (emphasis added).
